Abstract. We present a game theoretic study of hybrid communication networks in which mobile devices can connect in an ad hoc fashion to a base station, possibly via a few hops using other mobile devices as intermediate nodes. The maximal number of allowed hops might be bounded with the motivation to guarantee small latency. We introduce hybrid connectivity games to study the impact of selfishness on this kind of infrastructure.
Introduction
Hybrid communication networks are a promising direction to combine the features of wireless ad hoc networks with the advantages of wired networks guaranteeing flexible connectivity at low cost in combination with a high throughput close to the standards as encountered in wired networks. In such an infrastructure mobile devices connect in an ad hoc fashion to a base station, i.e., an access point to the wired part of the network, possibly via a few hops using other mobile devices as relay stations [11, 15, 16] . Since energy requirements increase super-linear in the distance between two devices, the usage of intermediate nodes can significantly reduce the energy consumption in comparison to directly connecting to the base station. This is of particular importance for up-link connections from the mobile devices to the base stations as mobile devices have rather limited energy resources. Using mobile devices as relay stations, on the one hand, might also increase the Quality of Service (QoS) due to a reduction of interference. On the other hand, however, the QoS suffers from an increase in latency if packages need to be forwarded several times until they reach the wired part of the network. For this reason only a relatively small number of hops seems to be acceptable.
Although the benefits of using multihop connections are convincing from a global point of view, one might ask why participants in a commercially operated network should forward packets of other participants, as this only drains the battery of the forwarding node, thus, bringing a negative utility to that participant. The usual response to this objection is that the forwarding nodes should receive a payment for forwarding packets. Let us simplify and assume that there is perfect information about the cost of forwarding packets. More specifically, we assume that the energy consumption for sending packets between any pair of nodes is publicly known and there is a common valuation per unit energy among the players, so that intermediate nodes can, in principle, get reimbursed for forwarding packets. Additionally, we assume that payments exactly compensate the cost players suffer in the case of forwarding packets. Thus, there exists no overpayments which could give an incentive to forward as many packets as possible.
In this paper we study the effects different payments have on the scenario that arises when selfish players aim at connecting to an access point. We introduce hybrid connectivity games as a game theoretic model for hybrid communication networks and study the existence, structure, and complexity of Nash equilibria in these games. Mobile devices are represented by players that aim at minimizing their individual cost. We assume that nodes get reimbursed for forwarding packets either by the network operator or by the senders of the packet. In our study, we focus on energy consumption while neglecting aspects of efficient frequency assignment and interference. The aspect of keeping the latency at a reasonable level is modeled by introducing hop constraints, which ensure that uplink paths are not too long.
The games that we study are variants of the connectivity games introduced by Eidenbenz et al. [9] . However, there are various technical differences between our model and their models. For example, the networks considered in [9] are assumed
